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(Nigel Radley & C. Neale Ronning eds., 1974);
International Responses to Traumatic Stress
(Nigel Radley, Yael Danieli & Lars Weisaeth
eds., 7995).

Mary L. Dudziak, Exporting American
Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African
Journey (Oxford Univ. Press 2008)
272 pages, ISBN 9780195329018.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Marshall's deeply influential role
in the construction of the bill of rights for
Kenya's independence constitution was
largely unknown until Mary Dudziak's

Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood
Marshall's Africa Journey. The "fathers"

of Kenya's independence did not seek to
highlight Marshall's involvement because
the positions he advocated were not
populist, and would have been of little
political benefit to the key actors. As a
consequence, the Kenyan constitutional
narrative is mostly silent on Marshall's
role. Although there has not necessarily
been a deliberate attempt to blot out his
contribution, no one had stepped forward
to give it pride of place. The result was
a national amnesia of the critical work
of one of the most celebrated African
Americans on the cause of Kenya's
independence.
However, in 2008, a comprehensive
account of Marshall's work on Kenya
came from the unlikeliest of quarters.
Dudziak was neither a law clerk to Justice
Marshall, nor an Africanist, although she
had written about race and the law in
the United States. She had never visited
Africa unti I the book was well under way
and from all accounts, she had studied
neither African history nor politics in any
sustained manner. In addition, she is not
of African descent, like some of Marshall's
devoted clerks such as Randall Kennedy,
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the Harvard law professor. But she is a
dynamic academic with diverse and in
triguing intellectual interests. A professor
of law and history at the University of
Southern California, Dudziak's curiosity
on Kenya appears to have been triggered
by her interest in race and law in the
United States and Marshall's central place
in the struggle for civil rights.
The result is a work for the ages. Dud
ziak's Exporting American Dreams cre
atively juxtaposes the African-American
struggle for equality in law with the Ke
nyan struggle for political independence
from white British colonial rule. With the
lessons of both struggles ever present,
Dudziak casts Marshall as a bridge be
tween the two epochal quests for human
dignity, drawing painful parallels. While
Kenyans sought freedom from colonial
imperial rule or external self-determina
tion, African-Americans sought equality
in a common polity dominated by white
Americans or internal self-determination.
Dudziak describes Marshall using his
experience in the latter to positively af
fect the former; yet, this is where some of
the tensions in Marshall's Kenya project
become evident. The iconic c·1vil r·1ghts
leader and eminent jurist analogized
too closely the struggle for civil rights
with the struggle for independence, or
majority rule.

II. CIVIL RIGHTS VERSUS
SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
It is easy to conflate the struggle for civil
rights with the quest for national indepen
dence. Both are struggles for basic human
rights, and there are obvious lessons that
each can draw from the other. The key
common denominator of both struggles
is anti-racialism: the struggle of blacks
against white domination. It is clear from
Dudziak's account that it is this kinship
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that drove Marshall to offer his services
for the Kenyan anti-colonialist struggle.
The struggle for civil rights under an
extant constitution, as was the case in the
United States, is a different contest than
the pursuit for black majority rule in the
context of colonialism and the struggle for
independence. One particular encounter
demonstrates that Marshall was aware of
the difference between the two struggles.
On his first visit to Kenya, Marshall sought
to address a meeting of Africans who had
been elected for the few seats reserved for
them in the colonial legislature. However,
a colonial officer stopped him because
he had no permit to do so. After pleading his case, he was allowed to say one
word of greeting. He shouted "Uhuru,"1
the Kiswahili word for "Freedom Now."
Pandemonium broke out as Africans
cheered him loudly.
It is not always clear elsewhere in
Dudziak's narrative that Marshall appreciated the importance of the difference between the Kenyan and AfricanAmerican struggles. Although Dudziak
is aware of the tension, it is not one
she fully confronts. When she does, she
is too quick to give the benefit of the
doubt to Marshall. The book implicitly
embraces the initial law and development
movement, which thought that imported
legal systems should deliver Africa to the
project of modernity. That is how Marshall comes off in many of the reported
conversations that he had with Kenyan
nationalists. In part, this is why Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga, the iconic left-leaning
Kenya African National Union (KANU)
nationalist, who became Kenya's first vice
president under Jomo Kenyatta, viewed

L.
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Marshall with suspicion. Odinga thought
that Marshall was a mole for US imperial
interests in Kenya.2
Partially, the suspicion surrounding
Marshall stemmed from his support of
white property rights in Kenya. The departing British colonial authorities wanted
a constitutional settlement that would
protect the economic interests of white
settlers. This meant guaranteeing white
settlers full property rights to land that
they had forcefully taken from Africans.
The KANU nationalists under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, on the other
hand, sought a strong unitary state with
the power to rewrite the rules governing
land. In other words, KANU wanted the
transfer of white owned land to Africans
without compensation. But Marshall
pushed for property protections for
whites, including compensation. In this,
Marshall's views coincided with those of
the British government. In the end, the
British view won out because London
would not grant independence to black
Kenyans otherwise. That is why the Kenyan independence constitution, known
as the Lancaster Constitution, contained
very strong protections for the white minority.3 Colin Leys has suggested several
reasons why the nationalists agreed and
acquiesced to Marshall's view.

DREAMS:

[Tihe moderating influence of Kenyatta
[leader of the nationalists]; the fear of
independence being delayed; the hope of
changing things after independence; a lack

of interest in the detail of the negotiations;

a fear that the rival party, the Kenya African
Democratic

Union (KADU), for whose

supporters the land issue was less vital,
• . . might agree to the proposed scheme

THURGOOD

MARSHALL'S AFRICAN JOURNEY 44

OGINGA ODINGA, NOT YET UHURU: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OGINGA ODINGA 177

MAKAU MUTUA, KENYA'S QUEST FORDEMOCRACY: TAMING LEVIATHAN59

(2008).

(1967).
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first and perhaps manage to get KANU
excluded from the transitional government;
and finally, the risk of alienating the former
forest fighters [Mau Maul if they were not
provided with land quickly.4
This dispute between Marshall and
Odinga regarding the class character of
the emergent post-colonial state came
back to haunt the Kenyan state in the
early days, and continues to vex it today. Odinga, a left-leaning nationalist
favored a transformation of the colonial
state to remove its oppressive conceptual bases and structures. Kenyatta, on
the other hand, was inclined towards
a more conservative orientation for the
state. Tom Mboya, another pivotal Kenyan
independence leader, allied himself with
Kenyatta against Odinga. Dudziak gives
Mboya, a charismatic figure, a long and
admiring treatment in the book.s
Dudziak draws many favorable parallels between Mboya and Marshall.
Perhaps the most important is both men's
proclivity for moderate temperaments in
politics. Both men abhorred radicalism
and communism. Marshall was even
opposed to the sit-ins organized by the
NAACP. Both men were more comfortable with the notion of respect for free
markets, private property rights, and
staid concepts of the rule of law even in
the face of unjust systems. Mboya was
rumored to have worked for the CIA and
Marshall would later travel in Africa at the
behest of the State Department to burnish
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America's image despite the violence
meted on African-Americans by a racist
power structure. Yet the pictures of both
Marshall and Mboya in Dudziak's book
are endearing. Perhaps here Dudziak betrays a soft spot for the project of political
gradualism, as opposed to the revolutionary movements of the day. In this, there is
an implicit rejection of socialism or social
democracy, which Odinga advocated,
and an embrace of the possibility of a
capitalist political democracy, which Kenyatta, Marshall, and Mboya favored. The
latter three thought that blacks would do
well once legalized racism was removed
from capitalist societies. In other words,
racism was the impediment to black
equality both in Kenya and the United
States. They failed to realize that race
cannot constitute a complete
theoretical
6
basis for full liberation.
The history of Kenya and the United
States prove that the end of racial segregation and the enfranchisement of blacks
were not sufficient to end privation.7 In
Kenya, the failure to transform the normative and structural foundations of the
colonial state retarded the post-colonial
state and denied it broad legitimacy.
Kenyatta would encourage the development of a crudely corrupt political class
under the guise of free markets and anticommunism. Marshall did not seem to
be too bothered by these developments
unless Kenyatta and the new regime failed
to respect the property rights of Kenyan

4.

COLIN LEYS,UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN KENYA:THE POLITICALECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM, 1964-1971,

5.

at 56 (1975).
It was Mboya who, along with baseball player Jackie Robinson and entertainer Harry

Belafonte, raised money for the first airlift of Kenyan students to study in the United
States in 1960. A historically important beneficiary of that airlift was Barack Obama,
Sr., the father of President Barack Obama.
6.

Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and
the Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999).

7.

MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM

(1996);

THOMAS F.JACKSON,FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHERKING, JR., AND
THESTRUGGLEFORECONOMIC JUSTICE(2007).
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minorities-whites and Asians. There is
no evidence that he ever pushed for land
redistribution to benefit dispossessed
Africans, or to create a more equitable
society for them. This is a disturbing omission on the part of Marshall, the iconic
civil rights lawyer who did so much as
a US Supreme Court justice to advance
the jurisprudence of racial equality in the
United States. One can only conclude
that his obsession with the protection of
minorities did not allow him to see a material difference between the Kenyan and
American contexts. He missed the critical
fact that in Kenya, racial minoritieswhites and Asians-were economically
powerful groups that either controlled the
state, or were favored by it over Africans.
In contrast, the African-American minority in the United States was marginal,
despised, alienated, and oppressed by. a
white power structure at the public and
private levels. No two contexts could
have been more different.
But it was the contradictions in the Kenyan post-colonial state that would upend
both Odinga and Mboya. The two would
become bitter rivals, and Kenyatta would
remove both as competitors for power as
he consolidated his own. Mboya, thought
by Kenyatta and his aides to be a threat,
was assassinated in 1969. Odinga fell
out with Kenyatta who detained and later
consigned him to the political wilderness
as the young post-colonial state became
decidedly authoritarian. The state drifted
toward personal rule, a culture of official
impunity, and a denial of basic human
rights. By the time Kenyatta passed away
in 1978, gross human rights violations
were becoming common. Daniel arap
Moi, his successor, created a corrupt and
murderous kleptocracy that ruled with
an iron fist.8 There is little doubt that the
8.
9.
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Kenyatta regime turned despotic partly
because of its failure to fulfill the expectations of the citizenry after independence. 9
That failure was a result of Kenyatta's
inability or unwillingness to transform
the predatory state into a robust polity
where Africans would thrive. Perhaps the
situation would have been different had
he worked more closely with Odinga to
pursue a social and economic justice
agenda for the state. Although Dudziak
alludes to these developments, she does
not trace them directly to the nature of
the state that Marshall helped give birth
to at Lancaster House.

III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
RULE OF LAW
Dudziak has written a book that is uncommon in American literature. What
Exporting American Dreams does is
thoughtfully chronicle the convergence
of a global struggle for human rights as
it unfolded in two countries-Kenya and
the United States. The story has romantic
overtones as an African-American jurist
traverses the world to assist his cousins in
Africa to overcome white supremacy, the
same cancer that his people faced in the
United States. One cannot but admire the
doggedness of Marshall as he attempts to
slay the demon of racism on these vastly
different continents. Dudziak correctly
paints Marshall as slavishly obedient to
law and order-even as he worked to
bring about justice within unjust legal
orders. The author depicts Marshall
in a one-dimensional lens-as strictly
beholden to social change within the
law. This faith by Marshall in a "natural"
process of evolutionary change within

7-27 (1991).
AFRICAWATCH, KENYA:TAKINc LIBERTIES
IN KENYA: FROM "HARAMBEE" TO "NYAYO!"
JENNIFER
WIDNER, THE RISEOF A PARTY-STATE
See

(1992).
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the law is somewhat of a paradox given
the brutalities that he had witnessed
both in the United States and Kenya.
Was Marshall really a legal conservative
at heart, or did he have an irrevocable
faith in the Anglo-American legal tradition and its ability to correct deviations
from justice? Or did he have an iron-clad
commitment to non-violent change? At
times, it seemed that civil disobedience
was to him unacceptable.
Dudziak does not probe whether
Marshall was simply incapable of accepting a return to the status quo ante
in Kenya where whites would have been
required to give up ill-gotten land without
compensation. Was this a commitment to
private property notions, or was it a deification of the law-albeit unjust law? Or
did Marshall see in the protection of the
property rights of the white and Asian minorities the foundation for a racially just
society? What about the property rights
of the dispossessed black majority? Did
Marshall believe that political or juridical
independence for black Kenyans could
be completely disconnected from their
economic needs? If so, then he tragically
misunderstood the purpose of the struggle
for liberation from British colonial rule,
including the deadly Mau Mau War for
independence in which the British committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity.10 Freedom from economic
exploitation and the right of blacks to
own and control resources was as important to them as political independence.
"Flag" or political independence without
the ownership of the national economy
would have been a pyrrhic victory.

Marshall was convinced from his
centrist American worldview that neither violehce nor radical social change
was necessary to liberate blacks from
white domination. This is a view that he
apparently applied without distinction
between Kenya and the United States.
In this sense, Marshall was the polar
opposite of the Black Power movement
in the United States or the Mau Mau in
Kenya. As Dudziak correctly notes, Marshall's vision of social change-what she
calls his "faith in the law as a vehicle for
social change"-was more acceptable to
whites than the confrontational politics
of the Black Panther Party." Dudziak
defends this vision of the place of the
law by Marshall and seems to endorse
his view that blacks were enslaved by
law, emancipated by law, segregated by
law, and would win equality through
law. 12 This dichotomy of how blacks
should respond to white supremacy has
13
been the subject of heated controversy.
Marshall himself said that "there is very
little truth in the old refrain that one
cannot legislate equality. Laws not only
provide concrete benefits; they can even
change the hearts of men-some men
anyway-for good or for evil." 14 This
is how Dudziak understood Marshall's
philosophy of social change:
Marshall's opposition to Black Power, then,
was not simply based on the tendency to
conflate Black Power and violent resistance. Instead, Black Power seemed to
reduce history to a raw dynamic of power.
The idea that only a power shift could
markedly alter material conditions for African Americans was at odds with his core
beliefs. It denied the rule of law itself "

CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN'S GULAG IN KENYA

DUDZIAK, supra note

(2005).

1, at 141.

Id. See alsoTHuRGOOD MARSHALL: His
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2001).

SPEECHES,WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS AND REMINISCENCES

RANDALL KENNEDY,SELLOUT:THE POLITICSOF RACIAL BETRAYAL
(2008).

supra note 1, at 141
Id. (emphasis added).
DUDZAK,
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There is no doubt that the use of the
law can bring about social change. The
history of jurisprudence in the United
States and other countries in the world
is enough proof. However, it is the nature, pace, and depth of the change that
are at issue. Even more important are
the historical legacies and other social
distortions that determine the effectiveness of the law as an instrument of social
change. Even in the United States, where
the law is fetishised by many as a key
engine of social change, social transformation has often come about first as a
result of political or other forms of social
pressure. Legal processes rarely move on
their own motion without some antecedent pressure from a segment of society.
In other words, the law is not per se a
cause of social change but a result of
politics. Furthermore, it would defy logic
to separate law or the notion of the rule
of law from the state monopoly on the
instruments of violence and coercion. The
rule of law isonly possible because courts
are backed up by the state which is itself
the embodiment of violence. In fact, the
state is not possible without its control
and use of violence as tools of social
order and stability. Law-in Marshall's
hallowed concept of the rule of law-is
the medium that civilizes and legitimizes
state violence. Otherwise, state violence
would appear illegitimate, arbitrary, and
capricious. Even so, the rule of law does
not necessarily imply a just and democratic society. Nor does it automatically
beget social justice.
It is Marshall's dogmatic fidelity to
the abstract notion of the rule of law that
16.
17.
18.

limits his vision of what was possible for
Kenya. Marshall ultimately failed to make
the necessary distinction between the
Kenyan and American struggles because
he was deeply wedded to conceptions of
the rule of law as the basis for a pacific
society. In this, he made the mistake that
the African National Congress (ANC) and
Nelson Mandela would make four decades later when they accepted the law as
an adequate medium for the transformation of the deep distortions of apartheid.
The consequence was the privatization of
apartheid in which white privilege was
left intact resulting in black alienation
and disillusionment.16 Aggressive reforms,
including wealth redistribution, would
have been indispensable to address the
plight of black South Africans. The law is
a double-edged sword and its proclivity
to protect the rich and powerful-and
whites in multiracial societies-has never
been in doubt. 1 7 Marshall's failure-and
that of the ANC-is a blind fidelity in the
law as a sufficient tool for social change.
Dudziak could have done more to interrogate this tension by critically exploring
the limitations of the rights discourse.
As it is, she privileges Marshall's faith in
the law and fails to show how the law's
hidden biases undermine equality and
sustain racial subordination. 8

IV. LEGAL FICTIONS AND BLIND
UNIVERSALISM
Dudziak could also have dealt with the
project of exporting Americana in a more

Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: the Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 63 (1997).
Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights, and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical
Essay, 23 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REv. 295 (1988).
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGALF. 139; ADRIEN K. WING, CRITICAL RACEFEMINISM: A READER(1998).
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critical and nuanced way. Just because
the exporter is an African-American does
not absolve the project of its imperial
proclivities. There is a vast amount of
literature pertaining to the critiques of
this enterprise that Dudziak does not
address. Marshall did not seem to be
aware of these contradictions, or even
whether his understanding of the role
of law in society was the proper one for
Kenya. Nor did he seem to question his
authority to challenge Kenyatta and other
Kenyan leaders when they deviated from
his script for protecting minority rights.
In one instance, he literally shouts at
Kenyatta and Mboya when the property
rights of an Asian are threatened. It is unclear why he assumed it was in his place
to countermand Kenyatta in this way. Was
he being an arrogant American, or did
a brotherly kinship to the new African
government permit him to be so blunt
in his relationship with Kenyatta and
Mboya? One may think of him as being
paternalistic. But the fact that he was a
black man must have given him some
license to speak in such confrontational
terms to the leaders of an African country
emerging from decades of white colonial oppression. Whatever the case, the
incident is a glimpse into the role of an
advocate for minority rights that Marshall
had carved out for himself.
Neither Marshall nor Dudziak interrogate the normative complexity of universalism. The Western project of exporting
political democracy is highly controversial. To many states and cultures in the
non-Western world, it smacks of imperialism. This project of the empire traces
its roots to colonialism and the original

19.
20.
21.
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purposes of international law.19 At the
heart of modernity isthe presumption that
Western civilization-Judeo-Christian
ethics and morality, free markets, and
political democracy-is the zenith of
human development which all human
societies should mimic. Thus a paradigm

isconstructed in which the rest must learn
under the tutelage of the West. It is the
manifest destiny of the West-the white
world-to elevate the rest of mankind
up the ladder of civilization. This racialized conception of human history and
its evolution explains colonialism and
most interventions abroad by the West.
The logic behind this theory is that
Christianity is the moral and naturalist
foundation of civilization, and the reason
without which full humanity is unattainable; thus, the coupling of Christianity to
the colonial project and the fusion of the
church, state, and empire are achieved.
Capitalism is constructed as innate in
humans, and, therefore, the basis for the
regimes of the ownership, protection, and
distribution of global resources. Finally,
political imperialism is an indispensable
paradigm in the ordering of the relationship
between Europeans and non-Europeans,
with the manifest duty of the European to
convey the gifts of civilization to backward
and uncivilized peoples.2 °
Dudziak is very much aware of these
debates, but chooses not to focus on
them in the book. References to them
are sparse and cursory. For example,
Dudziak argues in one instance that
"although Marshall would not try to
impose particular American laws on
Kenya, his very notion of the means of
social change was forged in the American experience."21 Yet Dudziak failed to

Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth
Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1999).
Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an InsiderOutsider, 45 VILLANOVA L. REv. 841, 849 (2000).
DUDZAK, supra note 1, at 64.
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recognize that Marshall did indeed try
to impose American notions of equal
protection norms on Kenya. Otherwise
one cannot understand his insistence on
"facially-neutral" norms for the protection
of minorities without regard to context
or the need for the use of the law to
transform deeply embedded social and
economic inequities born of the legacy
of colonialism. The entrenchment of the
rights of white landowners and the settler
society in Kenya prevented any meaningful social revolution to overturn decades
of gross human rights violations. All too
often, the law isused as both a shield and
weapon in the hands of the privileged in
the Anglo-American tradition, and Marshall's insistence on "rule of law" notions
in a post-colonial transition betrayed his
limitations as a change agent. What he
failed to appreciate is that Kenya's fight
was not simply an assault on legal segregation. Fundamentally, it was a struggle
for total liberation.
Although the failure by Dudziak to
focus on these debates is not a fatal
flaw, their inclusion would have helped
explain the tumultuous nature of the Kenyan post-colonial state. Kenya has failed
to cohere into a viable democracy partly
because the script on which it was based
uncritically mimicked Western models.
Today there is a growing realization that
successful and legitimate statehood must
be moored in values that are broadly
shared by the populace. Thus importing or imposing undigested norms and
structures under the guise of universalism
may create a veneer but not the reality
of progress. 22 For example, while equality
and participation in the political, social,
and economic life of a nation by minority

22.
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populations are keys to full citizenship,
each historical and cultural context is
different, and cannot simply be treated
as boiler-plate. Thus Marshall could not
simply lift the American experience and
duplicate it in Kenya without regard to
the context. The struggle for rights to full
citizenship by African-Americans is very
different from the struggle by Kenyans for
sovereign independence. Furthermore,
the economic and political relationship
between whites and blacks in the two
countries could not have been more different. In one, blacks are an impoverished
minority, while in the other, whites are
the privileged minority.
Equal protection and anti-discrimination protections meant radically different
things in Kenya and the United States.
That is why it is implausible to treat legal
norms relating to minorities as "neutral"
rules that could be applied anywhere
and everywhere without regard to context. How one envisions a rule within
a context determines how it should be
applied to achieve the aims of justice.
Protecting white property rights in Kenya
by the uncritical application of facially
neutral due process notions would simply
have frozen the racial hierarchies in place
with whites on top and blacks at the
bottom. The deification of certain legal
fictions as equality before the law can
be a subterfuge of social justice. 23 It also
fails to answer questions about equality
in fact. The purpose of equality in law
should not be a blind obedience to formal
legality, but an avenue towards equality
in fact. Otherwise social hierarchies and
oppressions can be privatized by law and
legitimized to the detriment of a common
citizenship. Sometimes it is necessary

William P.Alford, Exporting the "Pursuitof Happiness," 113

HARV.

L. REV. 1677 (2000)

(reviewing THOMAS CAROTHERS,AIDING DEMOCRACYABROAD: THE LEARNINGCURVE(1999)).

23.

See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); Karl. E. Klare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).
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to treat citizens unequally in the law so
that equality in fact can be achieved.
This is partly the logic underlying affirmative action. Redistributive justice
notions would require the rebalancing of
competing interests without the fetters of
formal equality. It is this discussion that
both Marshall and Dudziak seem to have
shied away from.

V.

INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND
ACCESSIBILITY

Exporting American Dreams is written
in a very clear and extremely appealing
style. Dudziak writes as though she was
personally a witness to the epochal events
in the book. The deceptively simple and
plain spoken writing style draws in the
reader, and makes for gripping reading.
Obviously, it helps that she is writing
about the "golden age" of the struggle
against racism in the United States and
colonialism in Africa. The people who are
the subjects of her work were the tallest
and sturdiest oaks of that era. The only
other towering African leaders in league
with Kenyatta were Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and South
Africa's Nelson Mandela. These men
defined the anti-colonial and anti-racist
struggle in Africa. In the United States,
the only other African-American leaders
in Marshall's league were Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Malcolm X. The lives of
these historic figures make for compelling
narratives which Dudziak has captured
in rich and captivating storytelling. On
several occasions I was moved to tears
by her vivid descriptions of brutalities
meted out against blacks in Kenya and
the United States. While on a flight from
Buffalo to Atlanta, I remember reading a
section of the book on the humiliation
and violence visited on black students
by the police and whites in Louisiana.
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From thirty-thousand feet above sea level,
I looked through the window to calm
myself down. I was overwhelmed by the
inhumanity of segregation and the cruelty
of racism. Dudziak's velvety writing style
partly induced those feelings.
An important virtue of Exporting
American Dreams is its accessibility. It
is written without pretension. Although
a law professor, Dudziak is an accomplished historian and political scientist
whose work is truly interdisciplinary. In
the book, she brings all her enormous
intellectual talents to bear on a complex
bundle of intersecting subjects-AfricanAmerican struggles for equality in a racist
society, Kenya's push for independence,
the role of law in social change, and
British imperialism. It is a daunting
task that required painstaking original
research, much of it in new areas for
her. An amazing fact is how quickly
she was able to develop a fairly good
understanding of the Kenyan history. But
it is the cross-breeding of the Marshall,
Kenyatta, and Mboya narratives in the
context of a global struggle for equality
that is truly inventive. The book blazes a
trail in an area in which little research has
been done. Prior to Exporting American
Dreams, very few people knew about
Marshall's pivotal role at the dawn of Kenya's emergence as an independent state.
Even in Kenya, which was the subject of
Marshall's efforts, there is virtually nothing in the public consciousness about
his work on the country. Yet in a sense,
Kenya's pro-American orientation can
be traced back to Marshall. That is why
Dudziak's book is a fund of knowledge
of enormous importance.

VI. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, Dudziak's book will not be the
last to be written about Marshall's Kenyan
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journey. Particularly interesting would be
further works building on this excellent
book by Dudziak and further exploring
the vexed tension in Marshall's vision for
the use of the law to transform Kenya and
the limitations of rights discourse gener
ally as an instrument of social transforma
tion. Was Marshall right in insisting on a
narrow reading of the rule of law even in
deeply distorted societies? Should there
be a boiler plate normative cure for the
protection of minorities no matter the con
text as Marshall seemed to believe?These
and other questions remain unanswered
in Dudziak's book. Yet it provokes them
and unwittingly demands that answers be
given. What is not in doubt, however, is
the fact that Exporting American Dreams
has established an inescapable bar that
others must meet.
Dudziak's intellectual courage and
boldness-going where others had not
gone before-is inspiring and deeply
welcome by those who seek to under
stand the breadth of Marshall's passion
for justice. His was a life lived in a rotund
pursuit of justice through the rule of law.
Even though there are obvious limitations
to a quest for justice framed in those
confines, no one can deny Marshalls'
profound impact on civil rights in the
United States and his influence on Ke
nyatta, Mboya, and the emergent Kenyan
state. Dudziak has weaved a classic tale
that intertwines this gripping narrative
in the hopeful diction of a thinker who
seeks universal justice. Her book is a truly
magnificent contribution to understand
ing Marshall, one of the towering figures
of the twentieth century.
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